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THE MDSO-UNCIVIL CIVIL COMMITMENT
American society both fears and is fascinated by sex.' The
supposedly aberrational activities of "sex offenders" have resulted
in innumerable attempts at societal protection. These attempts fall
into two major statutory categories :2 1) those statutes defining the
various forms of conduct proscribed as sexual offenses, such as rape,
pedophilia, or the "infamous crime against nature"'; and, 2) those
enactments outlining the medico-legal status known as the sexual
psychopath,4 sexually dangerous person,' or the mentally disordered
sex offender.6 California's codes contain both types of statutes, with
the former leading to a criminal conviction 7 and the latter culmi-
nating in a civil commitment.8
The controversy over civil commitment has raged for many
years 'between those who deem it a necessary and beneficial adjunct
to criminal proceedings" and those who denounce it as punitive and
nothing less than preventive detention. 10 This comment examines
California's mentally disordered sex offender proceedings, with par-
ticular emphasis upon the standard of proof used in the adjudicatory
phase, and the overall penal nature of this "civil" commitment.
WHO Is AN MDSO?
Thirty-one states currently have statutes dealing with mentally
disturbed sexual offenders." California terms such individuals
1 See the Best Seller List, N.Y. Times Book Review, Oct. 25, 1970, at 69, where
three sex oriented books place among the top ten sellers of general books in the
country. D. REUBEN, EVERYTHING You ALWAYS WANTED To KNOW ABOUT SEx has
been on the list for 40 weeks. Id.
2 R. KORN AND L. McCORKLE, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 158 (1965).
3 CAL. PEN. CODE § 286 (West 1970): "Every person who is guilty of the in-
famous crime against nature, committed with mankind or with any animal, is punish-
able by imprisonment in the state prison not less than one year."
4 See generally, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3501-22-3511 (1951); IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 9-3401-9-3412 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 225A-225A.15 (1959).
5 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 105-1.01-105-12 (1969).
6 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CoDE §§ 6300-6330 (West Supp. 1970).
7 See, for example, CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 264, 288, 288(a) (West Supp. 1970).
S CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6316, 6321 (West Supp. 1970).
9 See generally, Minnesota ex rel Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsay County,
309 U.S. 270 (1940); People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 311 P.2d 397 (1957);
In re Moulton, 96 N.H. 370, 77 A.2d 26 (1950); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584,
4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
10 Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (declaring that commitment
of allegedly dangerous persons constituted a form of preventive detention). See also
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) ; Hill v. Burke, 422 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.
1970).
11 ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§ 434-442 (1967); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6300-
6330 (West Supp. 1970); COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1-39-19-16 (Supp. 1969);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3501-22-3511 (1963) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 917.12 (Supp. 1970);
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'"mentally disordered sex offenders,"'1 2 or MDSO's. The California
Welfare and Institutions Code defines a mentally disordered sex
offender as : "Any person who by reason of mental defect, disease,
or disorder, is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses
to such a degree that he is dangerous to the health and safety of
others."' 8 This individual is not legally insane," nor is he always a
convicted sex offender. 5 Although MDSO proceedings are only
triggered by criminal convictions or juvenile court wardships, the
original offense does not have to be of a sexual nature. Individuals
convicted of death penalty offenses and those ineligible for probation
are excluded from the application of MDSO provisions in Califor-
nia.16
California civilly commits mentally disordered sex offenders,
not for their past criminal convictions, sexual or otherwise, but
solely upon the basis of their present status as MDSO's.' 7 An MDSO
may be confined until "cured" or until he is no longer a danger to
the safety of others."
GA. CODE ANN. § 77-539 (1956); IDAHO CODE § 66-317 (1956) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. cb. 38,§§ 105-1.01-105-12 (1970); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3401-9-3412 (1956); IOWA CODEANN. §§ 225A-225A.15 (1959); KA. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-1534-63-1537 (1959); MASS.ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §§ 1-11 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.964(1)-28.964(12)(Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. §§ 526.09-526.11 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 202-700-202-
770 (1949); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29.2901-29.2906 (Supp. 1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 173-A:1-173-A:10 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:164-3-2A:164-13 (1968); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-30-12 (1963); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2947.24-2947.29 (1958);ORE. REV. CODE §§ 137.111-137.117 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1166-1174(1965); S.D. ComP. LAWS §§ 22-22-9-22-22-10 (Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 33-1301-33-1305 (Supp. 1970) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-49-1-77-49-8 (Supp. 1969) ;
VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-8501-18-8506 (1969); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-278.2-53-278.4(1950); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.06.010-71.06.060 (1957); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-6A-1-27-6A-20 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 975.01-975.17 (1970); WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-348-7-356 (1967).
12 Cf. CAL. WELr. & INSTNS CODE §§ 6450-6457 (West Supp. 1970) which out-
line the procedures for mentally abnormal sex offenders. MASO proceedings occur at
the individual's or a relative's initiative, in the absence of criminal proceedings. Id.
18 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6300 (West Supp. 1970).
14 Ex parte Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 218, 233 P.2d 159, 162 (1951). See
also In re Bevill, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 442 P.2d 679 (1968); People v. Tipton, 90 Cal. App.
2d 103, 202 P.2d 330 (1949).
15 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6302(a) (West Supp. 1970) provides that a
conviction of any offense, whether or not a sex offense, may lead to certification to
the superior court for MDSO proceedings. See also In re Bevil], 68 Cal. 2d 854,
442 P.2d 679 (1968).
16 CAL. WELF. & INSTS CODE § 6301 (West Supp. 1970).
17 In re Bevill, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 858, 442 P.2d 679, 681 (1968); Ex parte Keddy,
105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 217, 233 P.2d 159, 162 (1951).
18 In re Kramer, 257 Cal. App. 2d 287, 64 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1968). See also People
v. Rander, 240 Cal. App. 2d 579, 49 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1966), which declared that the




MDSO CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEDURE
Sections 6300 through 6330 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code outline the procedures for the commitment of
alleged MDSO's. 19
A trial judge may institute MDSO actions only after the felony
or misdemeanor conviction of an adult offender. He may initiate the
proceedings upon his own motion, upon a motion by the prosecuting
attorney, or upon application by an affidavit on behalf of or by the
defendant.2 0 Juvenile court judges may also initiate MDSO pro-
ceedings for wards of the court, aged 16 or over. The procedure
for juveniles may be commenced by the judge's own motion, upon a
probation officer's motion, or upon application by affidavit by or
on behalf of the ward. 21 The commencement of MDSO proceedings
is mandatory following a conviction for a felonious sex offense,
involving a child under 14.22
After conviction or adjudication as a ward, the judge begins
MDSO actions by adjourning the proceedings in juvenile court or
by suspending sentencing in the case of an adult, pending the outcome
of the hearings on the defendant's status. 28 At this point, the judge
certifies the individual to the county superior court for examinations
and hearings to determine if he falls within the classification of
MDSO.24 Both juveniles and adults are certified to the superior
court and all subsequent proceedings apply similarly to both classes.
Prior to a hearing upon the certification, the superior court
judge assigns at least two, but no more than three psychiatrists to
examine the alleged offender.25 These psychiatrists submit their
reports to the court and may testify at the certification hearing.2"
A probation officer also submits a report to the court, outlining the
circumstances of the present offense, and the individual's past
history.27 At the certification hearing itself, in addition to the expert
testimony presented by the state, the alleged MDSO may present
other expert witnesses in his own behalf.28
19 CAL. WE=P. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6300-6330 (West Supp. 1970).
20 Id. § 6302(a).
21 Id. § 6302(d).
22 Id. § 6302 (c). If the offense is a misdemeanor sex offense with a child under
14, and the individual has a prior sexual offense, proceedings are also mandatory. Id.
§ 6302 (b).
23 Id. §§ 6302(a), 6302(d).
24 Id.
25 Id. § 6307. One psychiatrist must be from the medical staff of a state hospital
or county psychiatric facility.
26 Id. § 6308.
27 Id. § 6306.
28 Id. § 6311.
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After examining the reports and testimony, the court decides
whether to continue the proceedings or return the individual to the
original court for further action upon his criminal conviction orjuvenile court adjudication. If the judge finds that the individual
is not an MDSO, the person must be returned to the court of
origin. 29 If the individual is found non-amenable to treatment in a
hospital, but still within the category of MDSO, he may be returned
to the trial court.8" Should the court have reasonable cause to believe
that the individual is a mentally disordered sex offender, who is
amenable to treatment, the judge may impose the next procedural
step by ordering observation and diagnosis at a state hospital or a
county psychiatric facility for a period of 90 days.3'
The superintendent of the hospital or the director of the county
facility must report to the court upon the status of the alleged
offender within the 90 day observation period.32 Three possible
classifications may result from this report.83 First, the individual
may be found not to be an MDSO. As such, he must be returned to
the trial court. Second, the person may be a probable MDSO, but
non-amenable to treatment in a hospital. This individual is also
returned to the trial court. There, the trial judge, in his discretion,
may impose sentence under the original conviction, or he may re-
certify the individual to the superior court. If the superior court,
after a hearing, finds this person to be an MDSO, non-amenable to
treatment, and a danger to others, the judge may order the individual
committed to the Department of Mental Hygiene for an indefinite
period. Finally, if the hospital staff reports that the person is an
MDSO, who would benefit by treatment in a hospital, the court may
return the individual to the originating court or may issue an order
for "indeterminate commitment" as a mentally disordered sex
offender.
Within 10 days of such an order, the offender or a "friend"34
may demand a jury or court trial upon the single issue of whether
or not the person is in fact a mentally disordered sex offender. 5 If
three-fourths of the jury in this "civil" trial find the individual to
be an MDSO, he may be ordered committed immediately. 8
This trial and its potential or actual results provide the bases
29 Id. § 6315.
80 Id.
81 Id. § 6316.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. § 6318. "Friend" is not defined within the statute.85 Id. §§ 6318, 6321.
88 Id. § 632L
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for the following due process analysis of the standard of proof used
in MDSO proceedings.
IN RE WINSHIP AND THE CIVIL COMMITMENT STANDARD OF PROOF
The aforementioned proceedings for the commitment of MDSO's
have repeatedly been characterized as "civil" in nature by Califor-
nia's courts.87 Even though the actions are grafted onto "criminal"
actions, judges view the proceedings as separate, "civil" actions.
88
Within this civil framework, however, the legislature has provided
that the offender must be informed of his rights,89 and be afforded
counsel,40 cross-examination of witnesses,41 and adequate notice of
all proceedings.4 2 Further, the individual may demand a jury trial
upon the sole issue of his status.4
The trial upon the status of the alleged MDSO is, by statute,
a civil proceeding. 4 The standard of proof generally used in Califor-
nia civil trials is a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance
of the evidence is defined as "such evidence as when weighed with
that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and from which it
results that the greater probability is in favor of the party upon
whom the burden rests. 46 When the evidence is contradictory, the
preponderance test demands that the jury be controlled by the "ap-
parent credibility of the witnesses, rather than their numerical pre-
ponderance. ' 47 The plaintiff is entitled to a decision whenever the
87 See, e.g., People v. McCracken, 39 Cal. 2d 336, 246 P.2d 913 (1952); People
v. Loignon, 250 Cal. App. 2d 386, 58 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1967); Ex parte Keddy, 105
Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951). See also Gross v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d
816, 270 P.2d 1025 (1954). But cf. People v. Maugh, 1 Cal. App. 3d 856, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 147 (1969).
38 People v. Redford, 194 Cal. App. 2d 200, 14 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1961).
89 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6305 (West Supp. 1970). See People v. Austin,
260 Cal. App. 2d 658, 67 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1968), which declared that MDSO hearings
without proper advice of rights lack validity.
40 Id. § 6314. See In re Brown, 275 A.C.A. 624, 79 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969) up-
holding the right to counsel at MDSO hearings.
41 Id. §§ 6309, 6312. See also People v. Armstrong, 260 Cal. App. 2d 190, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 73 (1968), reversing an MDSO determination for lack of cross-examination
rights.
42 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6303 (West Supp. 1970).
43 Id. § 6318.
44 Id. § 6321.
45 CAL. Evm. CODE § 115 (West 1965) states that "except as otherwise provided
by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence." See
also Ford v. Chambers, 19 Cal. 143 (1861); Halberstady v. Nielsen, 113 Cal. App.
313, 298 P. 37 (1931).
46 People v. Miller, 171 Cal. 649, 651, 154 P. 468, 470 (1916). See Bruch v.
Adams, 259 Cal. App. 2d 585, 66 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1968); In re Corey, 230 Cal. App.
2d 813, 41 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1964); Lawrence v. Goodwill, 44 Cal. App. 440, 186 P. 781
(1919).
47 Shannon v. Mt. Eden Nursery Co., 134 Cal. App. 591, 592, 25 P.2d 849, 849
(1933).
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evidence preponderates in his favor, no matter how small the pre-
ponderance may be.4 One witness, if suitably credible, could con-
ceivably outweigh any number of slightly less credible people,
under a preponderance standard. 9
The United States Supreme Court has recently examined the
preponderance test and its relation to due process in the adjudica-
tion of juvenile offenders. The Court in the case of In re Winship"°
held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was one of the essentials
of due process during the adjudicatory stage of juvenile court
proceedings, where the juvenile was accused of an offense which
would be a crime if committed by an adult." By analogizing the
specific circumstances of the Winship case with those surrounding
MDSO actions, one can argue that MDSO's are denied due process
through the use of the preponderance test, and that alleged MDSO's
should be accorded the same proof standards applicable to juvenile
or criminal offenders.
The Supreme Court has long assumed that proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of criminal charges is a constitutional requirement.5 2
This standard of proof provides the basis for the presumption of
innocence, a cornerstone principle whose enforcement lies at the
foundation of American criminal justice. 3 The Winship court re-
moved any doubts concerning the constitutional stature of the rea-
sonable doubt test, holding . . . "that the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged. 54
In re Winship represents the Supreme Court's first application
of the "criminal" beyond a reasonable doubt standard to "civil"juvenile court proceedings. Juvenile courts have historically acted
48 Schumacher v. Bedford Truck Lines, 153 Cal. App. 2d 287, 314 P.2d 485
(1957); Neudeck v. Vestal, 117 Cal. App. 266, 3 P.2d 595 (1931).
49 "Except where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence
of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact." CAL.
Evm. CODE § 411 (West 1965).
50 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).
51 Id. at 1075.
52 "Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by
evidence confined to that which long experience in the common law tradition, to some
extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent
with that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, de-
veloped to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting for-
feitures of life, liberty, and property." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174(1949). See also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1880).
53 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
54 In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970).
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under the umbrella of parens patriae,"5 characterizing their actions
as civil and in the best interest of the child. The parens patriae
concept and its attendant civil framework allowed juvenile courts
to be somewhat more informal and flexible than their criminal
counterparts, but it also facilitated a denial of basic constitutional
rights.56 Until the landmark decision of In re Gault,57 juveniles in
many jurisdictions were not given the rights to counsel, adequate
notice, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, or the
privilege of protection against self-incrimination. The Gault Court
held these rights to be fundamental to due process in the adjudicatory
stage of delinquency proceedings.5" The Winship decision adds to
the Gault formula the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in the specific instance when the juvenile is accused of an act which
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. 9
Mentally disordered sex offender proceedings bear the same
civil labels as juvenile court actions. MDSO commitments are sup-
posedly for the protection of society and the rehabilitation of the
offender. 60 An alleged MDSO is, by statute, accorded all of the
Gault rights, 61 and should by analogy fit within the Winship rule.
The Winship rule only applies in the adjudicatory stage of
juvenile proceedings. An adjudicatory hearing determines the valid-
ity of the petition filed 62 -in effect, the guilt or innocence of the
child. The analogous portion of the MDSO procedure encompasses
the final phase of the statutory action-the trial. This trial provides
a ruling upon the status of the individual.6 3 Thus, as an adjudicatory
hearing for juveniles determines the status of the alleged delinquent,
the trial of the alleged MDSO decides his status.
Moving the analogy one step further, Winship applies to the
adjudicatory stage only when the juvenile is charged with an offense
which would be criminal if committed by an adult.64 Samuel Winship
allegedly stole $112 from a purse in a locker, an act which "if done
55 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); TAsx FoRcE REPORT: JUVENILE DEIN-
QUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1964).
56 See Lehman, A Juvenile's Rights to Counsel in a Delinquency Hearing, 17
JUv. CT. JUDGES Jourx. 53, 54 (1966).
57 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
58 Id.
59 In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1070 (1970).
60 People v. McCracken, 39 Cal. 2d 336, 246 P.2d 913 (1952); People v. Rancier,
240 Cal. App. 2d 579, 49 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1966).
61 See text supra accompanying notes 39-41.
62 See generally, N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 742 (McKinney Supp. 1970); CAL.
WEL. & INST'NS CODE §§ 681-707 (West Supp. 1970).
63 CAL. WELT. & INST'NS CODE § 6318 (West Supp. 1970).
64 In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1070 (1970).
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by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of Larceny. ' 6 5 A
petition set out the law violations which allegedly composed the
boy's delinquency, but the final adjudication was technically upon
the delinquent or non-delinquent status of the child.66
Mentally disordered sex offender trials also determine an in-
dividual's status, rather than the validity of any specific criminal
charges. Certification forms set out the alleged status of the indi-
vidual in terms of his predisposition to the commission of sexual
offenses.6 ' Past convictions or actions may provide evidence of an
individual's predisposition, particularly in the case of a convicted
sex offender.6  In the case of the person originally convicted for a
non-sexual offense, the certification essentially alleges a future pre-
disposition to harmful sexual offenses. In both instances, the allegedpredisposition, whether present or future, is toward criminal of-
fenses. Thus, the adjudication of an MDSO may constitute a deci-
sion upon a charge of future adult crimes, allowing the Winship
doctrine to apply.
Once the structural analogy between the Winship situation
and that of the MDSO is complete, the question arises as to why
the Court chose to reject the civil preponderance test in certain al-legedly civil proceedings. The Winship Court, in agreement with
the dissent in the lower court, 9 held "that where a 12 year old is
charged with an act of stealing which renders him liable to con-
finement for as long as six years, then, as a matter of due process ...
the case against him must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' 70
The potentially substantial deprivation of liberty provided a strong
push away from the preponderance test, toward the seemingly
stronger reasonable doubt standard.
The adjudication of Samuel Winship involved a potential loss
of six years of his liberty.7' The commitment of an MDSO may de-
prive him of his freedom for a lifetime.72 The MDSO may be
"hospitalized" and "treated" until he is cured or until he is no longer
65 Id.
60 Id.
67 CAL. WEL'. & INST'NS CODE § 6304 (West Supp. 1970).
f8 The probation officer's report in MDSO proceedings "shall include the crimi-
nal record, if any, of the person . . . ." and "pertinent information concerning the
circumstances surrounding the crime .. . " CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6306 (West
Supp. 1970).
69 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253 (1969) (Fuld, C.J., dissenting).
70 In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1075 (1970).
71 Id.
72 In re Kramer, 257 Cal. App. 2d 287, 291, 64 Cal. Rptr. 686, 689 (1968), de-
daring the potential of civil commitment to be life imprisonment. See also Meyers,
Psychiatric Examination of the Sexual Psychopath, 56 J. CRrm. L.C. & P.S. 27 (1965).
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a menace to the safety of others.7 If, after an extended period of
hospitalization, the individual is found to no longer benefit from
treatment, and, if he still constitutes a danger to others, he may be
confined indefinitely upon the grounds of a state prison.7 4 The po-
tential loss of liberty for an MDSO may far outweigh that applied
to Samuel Winship. In the Winship decision, Mr. Justice Brennan
declared that the susceptibility of the preponderance test to the
misinterpretation that the trier of fact merely weighs the quantity
of evidence made it inapplicable when an individual's liberty was at
stake.75
Under ideal conditions, a jury in a civil trial carefully weighs
the quality of the evidence in an effort to determine where the pre-
ponderance lies. Unfortunately, the quality of evidence may be di-
rectly influenced by the quantity of evidence. In a civil MDSO trial
or any other civil commitment proceeding, witnesses for one side
may so outnumber those of the other as to swamp the minds of the
jury. For example, if three psychiatrists affirm a status of mentally
disordered sex offender and only one offers a counter view, the
effectiveness of the counter view may suffer under the preponderance
test. No matter how persuasive the argument of the lone defender,
the fact that three of his colleagues disagree may outweigh any evi-
dence he presents. Under the preponderance test, only a mere prob-
ability of the status is required. There need be no moral certainty
or conviction in the minds of the jury as to the defendant's status,
only the slightest probability that the individual constitutes a de-
linquent or MDSO. 78 A reasonable doubt test, on the other hand,
provides the necessity of reaching a "subjective certainty" on the
facts in question.77 When a substantial deprivation of liberty rests
upon an adjudicatory proceeding, preponderance of the evidence is
insufficient under due process standards. As Mr. Justice Brennan
declared, "civil labels and good intentions do not obviate the need
for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts."" Neither
do civil labels remove the necessity of the presence of these safe-
guards from MDSO proceedings.
The California Court of Appeals, Second District, has specifi-
cally recognized the need for due process safeguards in MDSO ac-
78 See text supra accompanying note 18.
74 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CoDE § 6326 (West Supp. 1970). See also People v.
Barzee, 213 Cal. App. 2d 139, 28 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1963).
75 In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1074 (1970). See'Dorsen and Reznick, In re
Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAMILY L. QUART., no. 4, 26 (1967).
76 "In civil cases, which are decided in favor of the litigant upon a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence, the rule of the decision is after all, but a rule of proba-
bility." Wirz v. Wirz, 96 Cal. App. 2d 171, 175, 214 P.2d 839, 842 (1950).
77 Dorsen and Reznick, supra note 75, at 26.
78 In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1074 (1970).
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tions. In People v. Maugh 9 Judge Lillie declared that MDSO
proceedings are "similar to criminal prosecutions and the standards
of due process applicable to the latter are equally applicable to the
former."8 0 Thus, if the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard is
an essential right for criminal and juvenile offenders, alleged men-
tally disordered sex offenders deserve, and, in fact, have a right to
nothing less. A deprivation of liberty based upon a mere preponder-
ance of evidence in juvenile and adult MDSO adjudication hearings
results in a denial of basic due process. In these instances, the state
must bear the burden of convincing the trier of fact of the de-
fendant's status beyond a reasonable doubt.
PENAL ELEMENTS OF CIVIL COMMITMENT
Beyond the Winship argument for the incorporation of a rea-
sonable doubt standard lies the assertion that MDSO proceedings
are far too punitive to warrant anything less than the strongest
standard of proof. The deprivation of a man's liberty upon a merepreponderance of the evidence of a "predisposition" to dangerous
sexual offenses8' denies that individual the due process proof stand-
ard afforded criminal offenders subject to similar deprivations. An
examination of the history, purpose, and resultant impact of MDSO
legislation reveals that these allegedly civil actions are "penal in
nature and effect. ' 82
The Legislature passed the Sex Psychopath Act,8 the antece-
dent of MDSO legislation, because experience had shown that in-dividuals who came within the classification of "sexual psychopath"
were incapable of benefitting from ordinary imprisonment and werein need of medical treatment.s4 Many members of society were,
and still are, convinced that most, if not all, sex criminals sufferfrom some mental deficiency or disorder which causes them to contra-
vene society's moral standards." To facilitate the treatment of these
alleged sexual-mental disorders, California created an involuntary
civil commitment procedure in 1939.0 The procedures were made
79 1 Cal. App. 3d 856, 82 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1969).
80 Id. at 864, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
81 See Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969) stating: "Confinement
for a mere propensity is preventive detention. Particularly where the act in questionis commonly punishable only by a short jail sentence . . . ." Id. at 1103.82 Cf. People v. Smith, - Cal. App. 3d -, 89 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1970); In re
Valenzuela, 275 A.C.A. 537, 79 Cal. Rptr..760 (1969).83 Cal. Stats. 1939, ch. 447, at 1785 (1939).
84 See generally, Hacker and Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act in Practice: A
Critical Discussion, 43 CAL. L. REv. 766 (1955).
85 Id.
86 See text supra accompanying note 83.
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statutorily civil, in congruence with the treatment-oriented commit-
ment of insane persons.8 Unfortunately, what was conceived as a
treatment-focused civil procedure has gradually evolved into a
punitive action which is essentially criminal despite its labels.8 The
fact that MDSO civil commitment may lead to lengthy involuntary
hospitalization or even placement in a prison leaves little question
that the procedure has all of the consequences and dangers of a
criminal trial, without the criminal standard of proof. The civil
framework and vocabulary used in MDSO actions only thinly shroud
a penal purpose and impact.
The civil vocabulary utilizes terms different from, but still
analogous to, its criminal counterpart. An individual is "certified"
to superior court,89 not bound over. He may be sent to a state hos-
pital for observation and diagnosis,90 while the judge in a criminal
case, in committing a person to the Adult Authority, may effectively
send an individual to a diagnostic and medical facility within the
State Correctional system.
Ironically, however, the civil MDSO proceedings do not have
treatment as a primary focus in the commitment of offenders. A
California Court of Appeals declared in People v. Rancier9 that
"the main purpose of the Act is to protect society against the ac-
tivities of the sexual psychopath. The secondary purpose is to re-
habilitate ... the individual. The protection of society provides
the primary justification for most penal legislation, with rehabilita-
tion as an ultimate goal. The end result of penal or criminal statutes
is punishment; the outcome of civil commitment is labelled treat-
ment.93 When society gets to the point of imposing sanctions primar-
ily for the purpose of protecting itself, the result is nothing short of
punishment. 4 Whether the courts and legislature choose to call these
sanctions punishment or treatment, the impact of societal self-pro-
tection upon an MDSO is still an involuntary deprivation of lib-
erty.95 The individual receives neither the evidentiary protections
87 Id.
88 See text supra accompanying note 84.
89 CAL. WELT. & INST'NS CODE § 6302 (West Supp. 1970).
90 Id. § 6316.
91 240 Cal. App. 2d 579, 49 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1966).
92 Id. at 582, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
93 See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6315 (West Supp. 1970).
94 See H. PACKER, LnMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
95 "To be taken without consent from my home and friends; to lose my liberty,
to undergo all those assaults on my personality which modem psychotherapy knows
how to deliver, to be re-made after some pattern of 'normality' hatched in a Vien-
nese laboratory to which I never possessed allegiance, to know that this process wil
never end until either my captors have succeeded or I have grown wise enough to
cheat them-who cares whether this is called Punishment or not?" Lewis, The Hu-
manitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 REs JUDIcATAE 224, 227 (19S3).
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granted the criminal accused, nor much of the rehabilitative care
envisioned for his status.96 In a broad sense, the MDSO may be a
victim of society over-protecting itself.
To accomplish the purpose of societal protection, California's
Legislature has provided stringent sanctions for use in MDSO pro-
ceedings. The status of "mentally disordered sex offender" carries
with it an immediate penalty which may deprive an individual ofhis liberty for months, years, or a lifetime. An MDSO may be
confined until he is cured or no longer dangerous. In the case of theindividual who is officially declared dangerous and non-amenable
to treatment, the practical effect of the civil commitment may con-
stitute life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Even if released, the MDSO suffers a social stigma which may
never be removed,9" and which may well surpass that of the ordinary
ex-convict." As a "sex offender," he must register in every city in
which he resides for more than 30 days.' If he changes his address,
he must notify the law enforcement agency within 10 days.'
Once an ex-convict completes his parole, he is generally free to
move about and may be able to successfully conceal his former
status from those around him, including the police department. In
contrast, the MDSO carries his status with him constantly, and may
never conceal it from the local law enforcement officials. Conceiv-
ably, an individual never convicted of a sex offense could be com-
pelled to bear the status of "sex offender" around his neck like the
infamous "Scarlet A"'1 2 for the rest of his life.
Despite these potentially serious and permanent results of
MDSO proceedings, California courts have clung to the theory that
the actions are civil and non-penal in nature. As an example, the
court in People v. Barzee'018 declared that "sexual psychopathy pro-
cedures are essentially civil in nature, even though the place pro-
vided for custodial care and treatment be on the grounds of a stateprison." 0 4 This rationalization simply sugar-coats reality. 0 5 Mea-
96 Cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966).
07 In re Kramer, 257 Cal. App. 2d 287, 64 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1968).98 See Meyers, Psychiatric Examination of the Sexual Psychopath, 56 J. Carm.
L.C. & P.S. 27 (1965).
99 See Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and AdultOffenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WAsH. U. L. QUART. 147 (1966).100 CAL. PEN. CODE § 290 (West 1970).
101 Id.
102 N. HAwTHoRNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Heritage 1946). Hester Prynne was
compelled to wear a scarlet letter "A" embroidered upon her bosom as a "living
sermon against sin." Id. at 67.
108 213 Cal. App. 2d 139, 28 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1963); accord, People v. Levy, 151
Cal. App. 2d 460, 311 P.2d 897 (1957).
104 Id. at 141, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 692.'
105 See People v. Cross, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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sures which subject individuals to substantial involuntary loss of
liberty contain an inescapable punitive element. The reality is un-
altered by the facts that the motivations prompting confinement are
to protect society, provide therapy or otherwise rehabilitate the
offender." °6
The punitive view of allegedly rehabilitative legislation has
recently received support from a California appellate court. In
People v. Smith,' the court held that even if the civil confinement
did not constitute punishment in a historical sense, it was still puni-
tive to the person confined. Mentally disordered sex offender civil
commitments may not fit under the historical deterrence and retri-
bution headings of punishment, but the confinement is nevertheless
punitive.
The Smith court applied a penal view to a proceeding by the
California Youth Authority committing the defendant for a period
5 years beyond his twenty-fifth birthday. 0 Smith originally pleaded
guilty to rape. As a 19 year old, he was eligible for transfer from
the superior court to the Youth Authority. Following a parole and
subsequent revocation, the Youth Authority sought to confine Smith
for a period of five years after his twenty-fifth birthday, upon the
basis of a potential physical dangerousness. The parallels between
the facts in the case and those surrounding MDSO proceedings are
quite strong. The procedure appealed from in Smith involved a civil
commitment upon the basis of a dangerousness due to "mental or
physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality."'
0 9 Mentally disordered
sex offenders are confined because of a predisposition to dangerous
sex offenses due to "mental disease, defect, or disorder.""
0 In Smith,
the Youth Authority could transfer authority to the department of
corrections for confinement in a state prison."' MDSO's may be
transferred from the hospital facilities of the Department of Mental
Hygiene to other state institutions, including prisons."
2
The Attorney-General in the Smith case relied upon Sas v.
Maryland"' as a basis for arguing that the proceedings were civil
and non-punitive in nature. While the Sas court held that Maryland's
civil commitment statute for defective delinquents was fair on its
face, it recognized the potential results from the abuse of the provi-
sions. Thus, while Sas upheld a civil commitment procedure, it also
106 F. ALLE, Borderland of Criminal Justice 37 (1964).
107 - Cal. App. 3d -, 89 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1970).
108 See CAL. WEL. & INsT'NS CoDE §§ 1800-1803 (West 1969).
109 People v. Smith, - Cal. App. 3d -, 89 Cal. Rptr. 881, 882 (1970).
110 See text supra accompanying note 13.
111 People v. Smith, - Cal. App. 3d -, 89 Cal. Rptr. 881, 885 (1970).
112 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CoD § 6326 (West Supp. 1970).
118 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
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declared that such actions have the potential of becoming devicesfor "warehousing the obnoxious and anti-social elements of so-
ciety." 114
The court in People v. Smith" 5 specifically rejected the non-punitive argument put forward by the Attorney-General,11 declar-ing that although the challenged statutes were aimed at rehabilitation,
they were actually "penal in nature and effect. M 7 The court ap-parently relied more upon the potential effects of the statutes than
on the civil procedures attached to them.
As penal statutes, the code sections appealed from in Smith
were held to come within the Winship rule of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."' Mentally disordered sex offender proceedings, al-though designed for the protection of society and the rehabilitation
of the offender, are also of a punitive nature and effect. Punishmentlies in the province of criminal justice where the standard of evi-dence is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Punishment of an MDSO,
although officially called treatment, must not be imposed on a
standard of evidence less rigid than that applied to adult or juvenile
offenders.
CONCLUSION
The mentally disordered sex offender is currently confined uponthe basis of a mere probability of his status. The use of the higher
reasonable doubt standard would not affect the so-called beneficial
elements of civil commitment. Courts could still hold hearings on aninformal basis and the current range of dispositions would remain
open after adjudication.
An alleged offender may embark upon a course of sexual con-duct so dangerous to others as to warrant judicial intervention. Suchintervention should not subject an individual to the label MDSO
and a potentially lengthy confinement upon proof insufficient to con-
vict an adult criminal or a juvenile offender." 9 An individual being
considered for involuntary commitment because of his status as anMDSO should have the same protected rights as a juvenile,120 in-
cluding proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
"4 Id. at 516.
15 See text supra accompanying note 109.116 People v. Smith, - Cal. App. 3d -, 89 Cal. Rptr. 881, 885 (1970).117 See text supra accompanying note 82.118 People v. Smith, - Cal. App. 3d -, 89 Cal. Rptr. 881, 885 (1970).
119 Cf. In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1074 (1970).120 See Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally III in California, 10 SANTA
Ci.ARA LAWYER 74 (1969).
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Underlying this entire discussion has been the question of
whether society really needs the classification of mentally disordered
sex offender. Perhaps the best answer to society's label phobia was
provided in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass,'2' when
the Gnat asked Alice the type of insects she preferred. She replied:
"I don't rejoice in insects at all .. .because I'm rather afraid of
them-at least the large kinds. But I can tell you the names of some
of them." The following discussion ensued:
"Of course they answer to their names?," the Gnat remarked carelessly.
"I've never known them to do it."
"What's the use of having names," the Gnat said, "if they won't answer
to them?"
"No use to them," said Alice, "but it's useful to the people that name
them, I suppose . ..
The name mentally disordered sex offender or "sexual psychopath"
does nothing for the individual named. The classifications serve as
society's way of enumerating that which it fears or dislikes. Society's
fears and dislikes of the behavior of mentally disordered sex of-
fenders do not justify a standard of proof less than that afforded
other adjudicated offenders.
Mary Ann Grilli
121 L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LooxING GLAss 225 (Puffin ed. 1948).
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